Chapter 17

THE PROBLEM THAT ISN’T

Traditional theodicy fails because it accepts a false premise.

17.1 The Argument

The problem of evil is philosophy’s oldest and most devastating challenge to theism.

It can be stated simply:

  1. If God exists, God is omnipotent (all-powerful).
  2. If God exists, God is omniscient (all-knowing).
  3. If God exists, God is omnibenevolent (all-good).
  4. An omnipotent being could prevent suffering.
  5. An omniscient being would know about suffering.
  6. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent suffering.
  7. Suffering exists.
  8. Therefore, God does not exist.

The logic is valid. If the premises are true, the conclusion follows. Every theodicy—every attempt to reconcile God and suffering—must deny or qualify at least one premise.

The problem has two forms:

The logical problem: Can God and suffering coexist at all? Is there a logical contradiction?

The evidential problem: Even if no strict contradiction exists, doesn’t the amount and distribution of suffering make God’s existence improbable?

Philosophers have largely conceded the logical problem. It’s possible to construct scenarios where God has reasons to permit suffering—free will, soul-making, unknown goods. The mere existence of suffering doesn’t logically contradict God’s existence.

But the evidential problem persists. Even if God could have reasons to permit some suffering, does that explain the sheer quantity and apparent randomness of actual suffering? Children tortured. Natural disasters killing thousands. Animals suffering for millions of years before humans existed. The suffering seems excessive, gratuitous, unexplained.

17.2 The Attempts

Theodicy has a long history. Let’s survey the major attempts.

Free will theodicy. God gave humans free will. Free will makes genuine love and virtue possible—robots programmed to obey cannot truly love. But free will also makes evil possible. Humans choose wrongly; suffering results. God permits this because a world with free beings is better than a world of automatons.

Strengths: Explains some human-caused suffering. Preserves human dignity and moral responsibility.

Weaknesses: Doesn’t explain natural evil—earthquakes, diseases, animal predation. A child born with a painful genetic disorder didn’t suffer because of anyone’s free choice. Also: couldn’t an omnipotent God create free beings who always freely choose good?

Soul-making theodicy. Suffering builds character. We grow through adversity. A world without challenges would produce shallow, untested souls. God permits suffering because struggle produces virtue—courage, compassion, perseverance.

Strengths: Resonates with experience. Many people do grow through hardship.

Weaknesses: Doesn’t explain suffering that destroys rather than builds. A child who dies in infancy has no opportunity for soul-making. Suffering that leads to despair, bitterness, or death doesn’t build anything. Also: couldn’t an omnipotent God create mature souls directly?

Greater goods theodicy. Every instance of suffering serves a greater good that couldn’t be achieved otherwise. We can’t always see the good, but God can. What looks gratuitous to us is actually necessary from the divine perspective.

Strengths: Allows that our perspective is limited. Maintains that suffering is meaningful even when we can’t see how.

Weaknesses: Approaches unfalsifiability—any suffering can be “explained” by appeal to unknown goods. Also: is every horror genuinely necessary? Was the Holocaust necessary for some greater good? The claim strains credulity.

Punishment theodicy. Suffering is punishment for sin. Individuals suffer for their own sins; humanity suffers for Adam’s sin. The universe is just; suffering is deserved.

Strengths: Affirms cosmic justice. Connects suffering to moral order.

Weaknesses: Empirically false—suffering doesn’t correlate with moral guilt. Innocents suffer; the wicked prosper. Children are not guilty of Adam’s sin. The Book of Job explicitly refutes this theodicy—Job’s suffering is not punishment.

Eschatological theodicy. Present suffering will be redeemed in the afterlife. The scales will be balanced. What seems unjust now will be made right in eternity.

Strengths: Preserves ultimate justice. Offers hope beyond present circumstances.

Weaknesses: Deferred justice isn’t justice—it’s promissory. Also: can heavenly compensation truly “make up for” earthly torture? Can anything balance the suffering of innocents?

17.3 The Hidden Premise

Notice what all these theodicies share.

They accept the problem’s framing. They agree that suffering requires justification. They try to explain why God would permit it—free will, soul-making, greater goods, punishment, eschatological balance.

But this framing contains a hidden premise: that human welfare is the standard by which we judge the cosmos.

The problem of evil assumes:

  • The universe should be arranged for human benefit
  • Human suffering is cosmically significant—requiring divine justification
  • A good God would prioritize preventing human pain
  • If humans suffer without evident justification, something is wrong

These assumptions feel natural. Of course human welfare matters. Of course suffering requires explanation. We’re humans; our perspective is human.

But “natural” doesn’t mean “true.”

What if we’re not the center? What if the universe wasn’t made for us? What if our suffering, while real and painful, isn’t the cosmic scandal we imagine it to be?

This isn’t callousness. It’s perspective.

Consider: the universe is 13.8 billion years old. It contains hundreds of billions of galaxies, each with hundreds of billions of stars. Humans have existed for 300,000 years—0.002% of cosmic history. We inhabit one planet orbiting one star in one galaxy.

Why should this vast cosmos be arranged for our comfort?

The hidden premise of the problem of evil is anthropocentrism—the assumption that humans are the point. Remove that assumption, and the “problem” transforms.

17.4 Removing the Assumption

What happens when we drop anthropocentrism?

The argument becomes:

  1. If God exists, God is omnipotent.
  2. If God exists, God is omniscient.
  3. If God exists, God is omnibenevolent.
  4. Suffering exists.
  5. Therefore… what?

The logical link breaks. Steps 4-6 in the original argument assumed that an omnibenevolent being would want to prevent human suffering as a priority. But if humans aren’t the point—if divine goodness isn’t measured by human welfare—the inference fails.

An omnibenevolent God might will the good of the whole cosmos. That whole might include predator and prey, growth and decay, emergence and extinction. From a sufficiently expansive view, suffering might be not a bug but a feature—not a flaw in creation but an inherent aspect of finite existence.

This doesn’t mean God is indifferent to suffering. It means divine care might look different from what we expect.

A parent lets a child struggle with homework rather than giving answers. A coach pushes an athlete through painful training. A surgeon cuts to heal. In each case, permitting difficulty serves a larger good that the sufferer may not see.

These analogies are imperfect—human suffering often has no evident larger good. But the analogies show that “omnibenevolent” doesn’t simply mean “prevents all discomfort.” Goodness can include permitting difficulty.

The deeper move is to question whether human-centered evaluation makes sense at all. The cosmos is not about us. Our suffering is real but not cosmically central. The “problem” of evil presupposes our centrality. Remove the presupposition, and the problem dissolves.

Not solves—dissolves. The question “why does God permit suffering?” assumes suffering is an anomaly requiring explanation. But if finite existence inherently involves limitation, and limitation inherently involves lack, and lack is experienced as suffering—then suffering isn’t anomaly but structure. Not something added but something inherent.

The question isn’t “why does God permit this?” but “what did you expect finite existence to be like?”